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Abstract 
This paper is aimed at studying the determinants of currency crises suffered by Argentina 
from 1885 to 2003, on one hand, and at characterizing each particular currency crisis, on the 
other hand. 
Firstly, we identify crises episodes throughout the Argentine history. We apply the 
Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1994) methodology to sort crises from non-crises periods, 
and we distinguish among deep crises (crashes), mild crises and minor turbulences.  
Secondly, we look for regularities and common factors throughout history. We report the two-
sample Kolmogorv-Smirnov test of equality of distributions and the Kruskal-Wallis test of 
equality of population. We complemented it by estimating a logit model including a set of 
variables chosen from the prescriptions of the existing currency crises theories. 
Thirdly, following Kaminsky (2003) we perform regression tree analysis to classify crises and 
crashes into different varieties proposed by the theories at stake. We use fifteen financial and 
macroeconomic variables suggested by the empirical literature.  
It is found that fiscal imbalances were always present, which is consistent with the predictions 
of the first generation speculative attack models. All three methods used to characterize 
currency crises in Argentina show the importance of the fiscal side. Adverse foreign factors 
had also a key role in explaining crises. Finally, in most of the crises, regularities in the 
behavior of macroeconomic variables can be detected. 
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La crisis actual es la misma de 1870, la de 1865, la de 1860, de la 1852, de la 1840, 
etc. El país ha vivido en esas crisis desde que dejó de ser colonia de España. Podría 
decirse que no es económica sino política y social. Reside en la falta de cohesión y de 
unidad orgánica del cuerpo o agregado social que se denomina Nación Argentina, y 
no es sino un plan, un desideratum de nación. La diversidad y lucha de sus 
instituciones de crédito, la anarquía de sus monedas, la emulación enfermiza que 
preside a sus gastos dispendiosos en obras concebidas para ganar sufragios y poder, 
vienen del estado de descomposición y desarreglo en que se mantienen las 
instituciones, los poderes, los intereses del país. 
Juan Bautista Alberdi 
Escritos Póstumos. Estudios Económicos. Tomo I. 
 
En la historia monetaria argentina, a pesar de su confusa apariencia, nótese 
una serie de períodos de ilimitada confianza y prosperidad, de expansión en 
las transacciones, de especulación inmobiliaria y fantasía financiera, seguidos 
de colapsos más o menos intensos, precipitados en pánicos que originan la 
liquidación forzada de las operaciones, el relajamiento de la confianza, la 
postración y el estancamiento de los negocios. Sin duda, cada uno de estos 
ciclos no se presentan exactamente en las mismas condiciones, ni con 
idéntico carácter, pero, considerados en conjunto, es posible encontrar en 
ellos, hechos fundamentales que se repiten, cuyo análisis permite formular 
síntesis acerca de su evolución ... buscaremos demostrar que en nuestras 
crisis, aparte de las diferencias de menor cuantía, interviene un factor 
fundamental, ... y peculiar al grado de formación histórica del país.  
Raúl Prebisch  
Anotaciones sobre nuestro medio circulante (1921) 
 
I I. .    I I N N T T R R O O D D U U C C T T I I O O N N   
Social sciences researchers that explore the Argentinean economic history for the first time, 
usually get surprised by the repetitiveness in economic episodes
i. Those that deepen the 
study get absolutely astonished. Some economic events, like crises, seem to come and go 
over and over again. The Argentine economic history leaves us with the sensation of dejà vu. 
As sustained by former central banker Raúl Prebisch, more than 80 years ago (see 
quotation), characters may change, characteristics might be different but some fundamental 
facts are always present and can be traced throughout history.  
In the dawning of the nation, by 1880, the father of the Argentine constitution, Juan Bautista 
Alberdi, asserted that all the crises that Argentina went through since its independence 3 
 
resembled each other. Moreover, Alberdi sustained that all of them were driven by 
irresponsible fiscal policy, which in turn were caused by weak or lacking institutions.  
Many years later, President Arturo Frondizi recited the long litany of mismanagement and 
excesses of the argentine economy
ii. Frondizi might have been aware of Alberd’s writings, 
but he could not know that he would not be the last in the large list of conspicuous men 
pledging for sound institutions and discipline in fiscal and monetary policies. Moreover, from 
Frondizi’s years to the present, crises became more frequent and severe. According to 
Eichengreen and Bordo (2000), that studied an extended set of developed as well as 
emerging countries, Argentina had the largest number of crises not only in recent decades 
but also in the period 1885-1998, covered by their paper. Argentina was affected by most of 
the international and regional crisis as documented by Kaminsky and Reinhart (2002) and 
also generated its own particular episodes. 
The cost of several crises and crashes for Argentina, in terms of real output losses, has been 
huge, and possibly one of the largest in the world. The last crash, in 2001/ 2002, known as 
Tango, brought about a 15% decrease in real GDP and pushed vast sectors of the population 
below the poverty line. Similarly, the 1989 crash, which ended in hyperinflation, resulted in a 
9% fall in real GDP. 
What are these crises caused by? Do they always recognize the same causes? Which are 
the “fundamental facts” repeated in every crisis, mentioned by Prebisch in the opening 
quotation at the epigraph? To put it in another way, did Argentina suffer from the same 
disease throughout history? Were there different varieties of the same disease? Is there any 
particular deficiency in the immunological system of Argentina that makes the country prone 
to currency crises? What was the role of external shocks in the crises?  
This paper is not aimed at answering all these questions but at studying the determinants of 
the 19 currency crises suffered by Argentina from 1885 to 2003, on one hand, and at 
characterizing each particular currency crisis, on the other hand.  
Firstly, using monthly data, we identify crises episodes from 1885 to the present and classify 
them into three categories: deep crises (crashes), crises (mild episodes) and minor 
turbulences.  
Secondly, we look for regularities and common factors throughout history. We split the 
dataset in crises and non-crises years and we carried out non-parametric tests in order to 
establish weather macroeconomic variables, namely public expenditure, GDP, external debt, 
exports, imports and the current account deficit behave significantly different before and after 
crises. As in Eichengreen et al. (1994) we report the two-sample Kolmogorv- Smirnov test of 
equality of distributions and the Kruskal-Wallis test of equality of population. We also perform 4 
 
graphical analysis to study the behavior of key macroeconomic variables in the neighborhood 
of currency crises. 
Thirdly, since the previous studies are intrinsically univariate, we estimate a logit model. As in 
Frankel and Rose (1996) we include four groups of explanatory variables attempting to 
characterize Argentina’s currency crises. Variables were chosen from the prescriptions of the 
existing currency crises theories. 
Fourthly, following Kaminsky (2003) we perform regression tree analysis to classify crises 
and crashes into different varieties proposed by the theories at stake. We use fifteen financial 
and macroeconomic variables suggested by the empirical literature. While the logit 
regression approach misses the details but highlights the repeated facts, that is, the 
regularities; the regression tree approach stresses diversity, the recipe of each particular 
crisis. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II sketches some theoretical 
issues on currency crises. In Section III we briefly survey the empirical literature on the topic. 
Section IV explains the empirical results obtained from the graphic analysis, the logit analysis 
and the regression tree. Finally, section VI presents some conclusions, conjectures and 
guidelines for further research. 
I II I. .    T T H H E E O O R R E E T T I I C C A A L L    B B A A C C K K G G R R O O U U N N D D       
Krugman (1979) showed how inconsistencies between domestic economic conditions and 
the exchange rate commitment lead to the collapse of the currency peg. In his paper, budget 
deficit fully monetized is financed by Central Bank expending reserves. With the exchange 
rate fixed, investors get rid of the excess money supply by exchanging domestic currency for 
foreign reserves of the central bank. When such reserves fall to a critical threshold, a 
speculative attack is launched, causing reserves depletion and the abandon of the exchange 
rate peg.  
The speculative attack takes place when the shadow price of exchange rates (the price that 
would prevail after the speculative attack takes place) equals the exchange rate. At that 
moment reserves are driven to zero forcing the abandonment of the fixed exchange rate, and 
the economy switches to a floating rate regime. With reserves depleted, budget deficit is 
financed by money creation, which in turn causes an increase in inflation rate.  
Two important aspects of this model should be highlighted: the first one is that speculative 
attacks are not only possible, but also inevitable when fiscal policy is not consistent with the 
exchange rate regime. The time in which the speculative attack will take place is perfectly 
known forehand, so nobody is taken by surprise
iii. Secondly, there is no incompatibility 
between rational behavior and the (apparent) arbitrariness of currency attacks. Rational 5 
 
economic behavior, characterized by smoothly evolution over time, can be associated with 
dramatic attacks and changes in the exchange rate regimes. 
Second-Generation Models 
The so– called second generation models developed by Flood and Garber (1984b) and 
Obstfeld (1986, 1994) became widely recognized after the canonical crisis model failed to 
explain the European Monetary System crises (1992-1993). Second generation models are 
based on the existence of multiple equilibria. When investors anticipate that a successful 
attack will alter policy (even if they agree that currency policy may be consistent with the 
currency peg) it will be expected that future fundamentals (conditional on an attack’s taking 
place) be incompatible with the peg. In this case, government might defend the currency, but 
the costs (high interest rate, high unemployment rate) can be so onerous that government 
finally devaluates, so the market anticipates that action and acts in advance.  
The government compares the net benefits from changing the exchange rate versus 
defending it. Policymakers usually have as many good reasons to defend the fixed exchange 
rate but also to abandon it. For example, if government has a large debt burden denominated 
in domestic currency, devaluation would evaporate part of the debt. Or, if the country is 
suffering high unemployment rates, and nominal wages are rigid, devaluation would diminish 
real wages. But, on the other hand, in inflation-prone countries a nominal anchor is a 
guarantee against high inflation rates, so defending the currency keeps inflation under 
control. Another argument put forward to resist devaluations is that a fixed exchange rate 
facilitates investment and international trade. Crucially, the cost of defending a fixed 
exchange rate increases when people expect that the regime will be abandoned. 
Models of self-fulfilling attacks imply that good fundamentals are not enough neither to 
prevent attacks, nor to avoid a currency crisis. The state of fundamentals determines the 
existence and multiplicity of attack equilibrium. In Krugman’s model fundamentals may be 
consistent with exchange rate or not. In second generation models the same is true for 
extreme values of fundamentals, but there’s also a large middle ground over which 
fundamentals are neither so strong as to make crises inevitable nor so weak as to make an 
attack impossible. An important difference between this two models is that in the first the 
moment of the depletion of reserves can be anticipated, while in the second the timing is 
undetermined, so it can happens unexpectedly, and that is why they are considered so 
dangerous. 
Third Generation Models 
The Southeast Asian currency crisis in 1997 was the starting point for a new theory of 
currency crises. As Krugman (1998) points out, none of the fundamentals that led to a first 6 
 
generation crises were present in the Asian economies. Asian economies did not face severe 
unemployment when the crisis begun, nor had any incentive to abandon the peg to carry out 
expansive monetary policy. Besides, in all countries were present a boom-bust cycle in the 
asset markets. Fnancial intermediaries had a central role in the crisis. A mismatch in the 
deposits of the banking and non-banking system was present: the institutions borrowed short 
term money, often in foreign currency, and lent that money in long term domestic currency. 
The conventional currency crisis theories associated with inconsistency in present or future 
fundamentals missed the role played by financial intermediaries whose liabilities were 
perceived to have government guarantee, but were essentially unregulated and therefore 
subject to moral hazard problems. 
The evidence seems to suggest that Asian crisis was neither the consequence of fiscal 
imbalances, nor were the incentives to follow an expansive monetary policy, but were the 
problems with financial intermediaries that drove the crisis. The excessive risk lending led to 
inflation in the asset prices. When the crisis burst, the asset prices fall, the insolvency of 
intermediaries were visible, forcing them to cease operations, which in turn implied further 
deflation in asset prices.  
Sudden Stop Models 
The sudden stop theory of currency crises emphasizes the liquidity problem in emerging 
economies due to a sudden stop, that is, episodes of sudden and massive reversal in capital 
inflows. The reversions generally happen in countries that have experienced heavy capital 
inflows and consequently important current account deficits. To face this sudden capital 
outflow, governments spend reserves, which increases financial vulnerability and finally 
devaluates its currency. The resulting reverse in current account deficit impacts on economic 
activity and employment. This line of research is only recent and is associate to the works of 
Calvo (1998), Calvo and Reinhart (2000) and Calvo, Izquierdo and Talvi (2002)  
I II II I   E E M MP P I I R R I I C C A A L L    L L I I T T E E R R A A T T U U R R E E   
The numerous empirical researches on currency crises focused on two types of studies: (a) 
the analysis of specific events or particular countries and, (b) cross-country analysis. They 
are mainly dedicated to: 
•  Analysis of the probability of crises  
•  Test for contagion and determining the channels through which contagion occurs 
•  Establish the relationship between currency and banking crisis 
•  Comparison of historic and recent crises 
•  Test for specific theories of what causes crises in a given country or group of 
countries.  7 
 
Table 1 summarizes some of the most relevant papers in the recent empirical literature. 
 
Table 1. Empirical literature 
Authors  Period  Countries 
Blanco and Garber (1986)  1973-1982  Mexico 
Cumby and Wijnbergen (1989)  Dec 1978- -April 1981  Argentina 
Eitchengreen, Rose and 
Wyplosz (1994) 
1967-1992  22 Emerging and developed countries 
suffering a crisis  
Klein and Marion (1994)  1957-1991  -Monthly 
data 
Panel data for 16 Latin American 
countries 
Pazarbasioglu and Otker 
(1994) 
1979-1993 - Monthly 
data 
Denmark, Ireland, Norway, Spain and 
Sweden 
Calvo and Mendoza (1996)  1994-1995   Mexico 




20 industrialized countries 
Frankel and Rose (1996)  1971-1992  105 countries 
Sachs, Tornell and Velasco 
(1996) 
1994/1995  20 emerging economies 
Flood and Marion (1997)  January  1957-January 
1991 
80 episodes of fixed exchange rate in 
17 Latin American countries 
Burnside, Eichenbaum and 
Rebelo (1998) 
July 1995-May 1998  Indonesia,  Malaysia,  Thailand,  Korea, 
Philippines, Hong Kong, Singapore and 
Taiwan 
Chang and Velasco (1998)  1987-1997  Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, 
Thailand, Mexico, Argentina, Brazil and 
Chile 
IMF  (1998)  1975-1997  50 industrialized and emerging 
countries 
Kaminsky, Reinhart and 
Lizondo (1998) 
1970-1995  15 developed and 5 developing 
countries 
Berg and Pattillo (1999)  1997  Asian countries 
Glick and Rose(1999)  1971,  1973,  1992-
1993, 1994-1995, 
1997-1998  
161 countries affected by crises 
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999)  Crisis 1997  Asian countries 
Tornell (1999)  1985-1995  Hong Kong and 22 emerging countries 
Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000)  1997-1999 - daily data  35 countries 
Moreno and Trehan (2000)  1974-1997  post 
Bretton Woods  
121 countries 
Eichengreen and Bordo (2002)  1883-1998  21 emerging and developed countries 
Kaminsky, Reinhart and Vegh 
(2002) 
1826-2002  Countries affected by different crises 
Kaminsky (2003)  1970-2002   20 countries 
 
In the first generation models, crises should have a significant predictable component. 
Previous to the speculative attack we should observe an expansive fiscal and monetary 
policy, and a decline in international reserves for long periods. On the other hand, second 
generation models imply that speculative attacks should be followed by expansive monetary 
and fiscal policies. Third generation models emphasize the role played by financial 8 
 
intermediaries, so they analyze variables related to them, such as the liquidity coefficient, 
solvency of the financial sector, external debt maturity, and assets denomination versus 
liabilities. 
I IV V. .   I I D D E E N N T T I I F F Y Y I I N N G G    C C U U R R R R E E N N C C Y Y    C C R R I I S S E E S S   
There is not a unique definition of currency crisis, however most economists would agreed 
that a currency crisis is an speculative attack against currency that ends up in a devaluation if 
the attack is successful. Nonetheless authorities may defend from the attack by losing foreign 
reserves and/or by increasing the rate of interest. 
One of the key questions to be solved in the analysis of crisis is how to identify speculative 
attack in foreign exchange rate, and to determine under what circumstances the movement in 
these indicators represents a crisis. The following questions arise: Is a currency crisis limited 
to exchange rate devaluation? How large a movement must be to be considered a crisis? 
How large a devaluation must be to qualify for a crisis in high inflation periods?. 
Eichengreen et al (1994) propose a weighted index of speculative attack that includes 
changes in the exchange rate, in the international reserves and in the interest rates. Each 
component is weighted by the inverse of its variability. As Moreno and Trehan (2000) point 
out this approach implicitly assumes that one standard deviation change in the interest rate 
represents as much as for a currency crisis as one standard deviation change in exchange 
rates or reserves. Many researchers followed a similar methodology. For example, Kaminsky 
and Reinhart (1999) construct a similar index, but they exclude interest rate arguing data 
availability, particularly, that interest rates series are not consistently available for the whole 
sample they use.  
Frankel and Rose (1996) construct the most obvious indicator of crises: changes in the 
nominal exchange rate. They exclude reserves and interest rates on the grounds that foreign 
reserve data contains a lot of noise, and few countries have market-determined short-term 
interest rates. Moreover, since a successful speculative attack ends up in currency 
devaluation (and that is the case in most emerging countries) only changes in the nominal 
exchange rate are needed to determine currency crises
iv.  
The second issue is related to how big a movement in the index should be to be considered a 
speculative attack. There are also different criteria. Frankel and Rose (1996) propose an 
absolute cutoff. Most researchers, however, rely on the moments of the distribution (mainly 
mean and standard deviation) to determine crisis. Some of them use the moments of the 
distribution of the index (for example Eichengreen et al., 1994, Reinhart and Kaminsky, 
1999), while others prefer the moments of the component of the index (Moreno, 1995).  9 
 
In high inflation episodes, rates of depreciation are consequently high. To ensure we are not 
considering each of these deprecations as an independent crisis, it is necessary to compute 
separate standard deviations for those periods. As pointed out by Reinhart and Kaminsky 
(1999), if standard deviation is computed for the full sample, many crises may be identified 
during inflationary episodes, while many others shall remain unidentified outside the 
inflationary period. 
From the discussion we see that no measure of currency crises is perfect, they all have pros 
and cons, and there are always elements of arbitrariness. We choose an index similar to the 
one proposed by Eichengreen et al (1994) and Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999)
v, since we are 
interested in all speculative attack, successful or not. This specification of the index will allow 
us to capture episodes like “Tequila”, where authorities managed to keep the peg, despite the 
drainage in reserves and the increase in interest rate. 
The index stems from the idea that market pressure increases when exchange rate 
devaluates (rises), when interest rates increase and when international reserves fall. Under a 
floating exchange rate regime, we expect abrupt increases in the exchange rate as crisis 
develops, while under a fixed exchange rate, prior to devaluation, interest rates increase and 
international reserves diminish. 
We use the rate of change of nominal interest rate rather than the difference between the 
domestic and international rate, as in other papers, due to the inflationary process Argentina 
went through during several decades. These inflationary processes implied high and volatile 
rate of interest, and given the relative constancy of the international rate, the difference 
between domestic and international rate proved to be meaningless to capture turbulent 
periods. The Market Turbulent Index (MTI) is: 
 
Where the symbol 
∧ ∧ ∧ ∧ represents the growth rate of the variable, e is the exchange rate, R 
stands for international reserves, I is the domestic interest rate and σ σ σ σe, σ σ σ σR, σ σ σ σI are the standard 
deviations of the growth rate of the exchange rate, international reserves and domestic 
interest rate, respectively. 
The Index is weighted by the inverse of the respective standard deviation to avoid the most 
variable component dominates the index movements. However, we also used different 
σ σ σ σ σ σ σ σ σ σ σ σ i R e
i R e
MTI
ˆ ˆ ˆ + + + + − − − − = = = =10 
 
weights to test the robustness of the index, and the crisis determination proved to be quite 
robust to different weight specifications.  
The index was computed with monthly data from 1885 to 2002
vi. We imposed different criteria 
to sort crises, but whenever the MTI is greater than the mean (µ) plus k standard deviations 
(STD) we identify a “signal” or “turbulent episode”.  
We require at least two “close” months with MTI greater than the mean value plus three STD 
to consider that episode as deep crisis or “crash”. If the MTI is greater than µ µ µ µ plus two STD 
but less than µ µ µ µ plus three STD, we call it “mild crisis”. If MTI exceeds its mean value in a half 
STD at least twice the episode is considered “minor turbulence”. The remaining episodes, i.e. 
when the index departs less than one half standard deviation from the average are termed as 
“non- crisis” or tranquility times. In high inflation episodes (1976 and 1989), we excluded the 
data for the estimation of the moments, to preclude these data distort the “signals”. 
In order to determine the boundaries of a given crisis and so avoiding dating twice the same 
crisis, we require at least six months with no signals between each other. 
Table 2. Criteria to sort Crises 
Monthly Data 
Criteria 
Index  # of Signals 
Classification 
MTI < 0.5 σMTI   Non-  crisis 
0.5 σMTI<MTI< 2 σMTI  Two close months  Minor Turbulence 
2  σMTI <MTI < 3 σMTI  Two close months  Mild 
MTI > 3 σMTI  Two close months  Deep 
 
The  MTI was computed for five sub periods in order to keep its variance relatively 
homogeneous. Sub periods were chosen by political, economical and historical events. The 
sub periods chosen were the following:  
(a) 1885-1913: from Roca to the First World War 
(b) 1914- 1945: the Interwar Period:  
(c) 1946- 1976: from Perón to Perón:  
(d)  1976- 1991: from Hyper Inflation to Hyper Inflation:  
(e)  1992 – 2002: Convertibility, from boom to burst:  
It is worth remark that the terms “tranquility”, “minor turbulence”, “mild” and “deep” are 
referred to the sub period considered and does not intent to be an absolute qualification for 
the whole period. 11 
 
D D A A T T A A   
Considerably effort has been devoted on the construction of time series for 117 years. The 
market turbulence index was computed from monthly data from 1914 to the present. 
Exchange rates were taken from Vázquez- Presedo (1971 and 1975), Ámbito Financiero 
(1984) and FIEL. To construct the international reserves series we use data from Vázquez- 
Presedo (1971 and 1975) International Monetary Fund and Banco Central de la República 
Argentina (BCRA). Interest rates were taken from Vázquez-Presedo (1971 and 1975), FIEL 
and BCRA. Monetary, fiscal and international trade variables were obtained from Cortés 
Conde (1989) and also from BCRA, Ministerio de Economía de la Nación, Vázquez-Presedo 
and from Gerchunoff and Llach (2003). Recent data of terms of trade as well as exports and 
imports comes from CEPAL. 
T T H H E E    C C L L A A S S S S I I F F I I C C A A T T I I O O N N     O O F F    C C R R I I S S E E S S   
We dated 20 crises throughout 118 years of history. 5 crises were rated as “crashes”, 9 as 
“mild” and 7 as minor turbulence. Interestingly, the number and magnitude of the crises 
increases through time (see Table 2). The five “deep crises” identified correspond to the 
years, 1890-91, 1929-32, 1975-76, 1989-91 and 2001-02. 
Table 3. Crises Summary 



















Mild  Minor 
Turbulence 
1885 - 
1913  28 2  4  14.2  5.4*  1  1  0 
1914 - 
1945  32 4  7  23.3  3.1  1  1  2 
1946 – 
1976  31 7  10  32.2  3.8  1  4  3 
1977 – 
1991  15 4  9  60.0  0.4  1  2  1 
1992- 
2003  12 2  3  25  2.1  1  1  0 
Total 118  20  33  23  3.3  5  9  6 
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The 20 crises implied 33 crises years. That is, in 22% of the 118 years considered, Argentina 
was in crises, which meant one crisis year every 3.6 years. A given year is considered a 
crisis year if the market turbulence index exceeds one standard deviation from the average in 
at least 2 months, consecutive or alternate. 
According to our index, the most turbulent period of Argentina’s history was 1977 –1991, not 
only because it registered 4 crises in 15 years, but also because nine of those years were 
crisis years, which meant 60% of these years in crisis (see Appendix, Table 2A for details).  
 
V V. .   E E M MP P I I R R I I C C A A L L    R R E E S S U U L L T T S S   
How did the Argentine economy perform in the neighborhood of crashes? Is there any 
regularity in the behavior of the macroeconomic variables around these extreme episodes? 
Moreover, are there any repeated factors contributing to the large number of crises 
throughout the argentine history? Or is it that each crisis is unique in the sense that it is 
caused by a different set of factors? Our strategy to answer these questions will involve four 
steps, each containing different tests. Firstly, we split the dataset in crises and non-crises 
years and we carried out several non-parametric tests in order to establish whether key 
macroeconomic variables, suggested by the existing currency crises theories, behave 
significantly different before and after crises. Secondly, we perform graphical analysis to 
study the behavior of these macroeconomic variables in the neighborhood of currency crises. 
Thirdly, since the previous studies are intrinsically univariate, we estimate a logit model to 
characterize Argentina’s currency crises. Finally, following Kaminsky (2003), we perform 
regression tree analysis to classify crises and crashes into different varieties proposed by the 
theories at stake. As in the logit model, we include several financial and macroeconomic 
variables suggested by the extended empirical literature. It is worthwhile to notice that 
Regression Tree and Logit analysis complement each other rather than compete. The logit 
regression approach misses the details but highlights the repeated facts, that is, the 
regularities; while the regression tree approach stresses diversity, the set of factors that 
contribute to each particular crisis. 
N N O O N N- -P P A A R R A A M ME E T T R R I I C C    T T E E S S T T S S   
Table 4 shows four tests of equality of population (Wilcoxon, Median Chi-square, Kruskal-
Wallis and van der Waerden) and table 5 contains the Kolmogorv-Smirnov test for equality of 
distributions. The null hypothesis of the first group of tests is that the sample median of each 
selected macroeconomic variable does not differ significantly during crises and non-crises 
periods. The statistics tabulated are values of these tests under the null, so small probabilities 13 
 
value computed let us reject the null. We reject the null for all variables, excepting Current 
Account Deficit (CA) and Terms of Trade (TOT), for all the methods reported.  
We also tabulated the two-sample Kolmogorv-Smirnov test for equality of distributions. Under 
the null hypothesis MTI and macro variables have the same distribution in crises and non-
crises periods. As in the tests of equality of population, the small probability values obtained 
led us to reject the null for all variables except for Current Account Deficit (CA) and Terms of 
Trade (TOT).  
 
Table 4. Panel A. Test of equality of population.  
Method  GDP  Public 
Expenditure 
Public 
Revenue  Inflation  M3 
Wilcoxon/Mann-Whitney 3.8**  2.6**  3.6**  4.4**  2.6** 
Med. Chi-square  9.6**  2.8**  11.7**  11.7**  2.3** 
Kruskal-Wallis 14.5**  6.9**  13.1**  19.5**  6.8** 
van der Waerden  14.3**  7.0**  13.7**  21.6**  8.4** 
Note:   * p-value less than 5%.  
** p-value less than 1% 
 
Table 4. Panel B. Test of equality of population.  
Method  Exports  Imports  CA/GDP  TOT 
Wilcoxon/Mann-Whitney 2.51**  3.09**  0.91 1.87 
Med. Chi-square  10.25**  7.08**  0.94  3.05 
Kruskal-Wallis 6.31**  9.56**  0.83  3.53 
van der Waerden  7.06**  10.16**  0.71  3.01 
Note: ** p-value less than 1% 
These results are consistent to the ones obtained by Eichengreen et al (1994). They found 
significant differences between crises and non-crises periods for emerging economies but 
none for European countries. These evidence supports the predictions of the first generation 
BOP crisis models. As argued by Eichengreen et al (1994), if speculative attacks are caused 
by self-fulfilling prophecies or simply by changes in expectation (as suggested by the second 
generation models), there should be no significant differences in macro variables behavior 
during periods of speculative attacks and tranquility. But, if we observe significant differences, 
the nature of these differences may reflect the inconsistent macroeconomic policies.  
Unequal behavior in monetary and fiscal policy indicators during periods of crisis versus non-
crisis may shed light on whether an expansionary monetary and fiscal policy may trigger 
speculative attacks as in Krugman´s first generation model. 14 
 
On the other hand, some internal or external indicators may signal high government’s high 
costs of maintaining the peg, leading to a shift in expectations that may trigger a speculative 
attack, as in second-generation model. For example, a high rate of unemployment or a 
current imbalance may have this role, as suggested by Obstfeld (1994) and Drazen and 
Masson (1994) 
Table 5. Panel A. Kolmogorov- Smirnov Test.  
  GDP*  Public 
Expenditure * 
Public 
Revenue*  Inflation  M3* 
Kolmogorov Smirnov  0,45  0,32  0,44  0,51  0,51 
P-value 0,00  0,02  0,00  0,00  0,00 
Corrected 0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00 
 
Table 5. Panel B. Kolmogorov- Smirnov Test.  
  Exports*  Imports*  CA/GDP  TOT 
Kolmogorov Smirnov  0,36  0,42  0,14  0,12 
P-value 0,01  0,00  0,71  0,88 
Corrected 0,00  0,00  0,63  0,83 
 
G G R R A A P P H H I I C C    A A N N A A L L Y Y S S I I S S   
Once we established that main macroeconomic variables have significantly different behavior 
before and after crises episodes, we attempt to describe how each macroeconomic variable 
moves in the neighborhood of crises. 
Each of the graphics portrays the movement in a variable of interest three years before and 
three years after the crisis. As Frankel and Rose (1996) point out, a graphical approach has 
advantages and disadvantages. Among the first, a graphical analysis imposes non-
parametric structure on the data, makes only a few assumptions that are necessary in 
inference statistics, and they are often more accessible and informative than tables with 
estimations of coefficients. On the other hand, they are informal, and intrinsically univariate.  
A brief comment on each variable follows.  
•  GDP growth reaches a peak two years before the beginning of crises (on average, it grows  
5.7%) and the trough at the moment of the crises (-3.6%, on average). The difference 
between peak and trough is 9.3%, on average. 
•  Public Expenditure Growth: the peak is observed two periods before the crises (on 
average, increases 8.7%) and the trough at t+1 with an average value of 0.4% (which 
means a fall of 8.3%) 15 
 
•  Fiscal deficit (as % of GDP) increases before crises and peaks during the crises at an 
average level greater than 4%.  
•  Inflation: peaks during the crises and falls abruptly in t+1. 
•  Real Money (M3/P): it reaches a peak in t-2  (18.6% on average) and a trough during the 
crises, averaging -7.4%.  
•  Current Account Deficit (as % of GDP) reaches a peak at t-1 (average -2.33) and a trough 
at t (-0.38%), i.e. an improvement of 2% 
•  Real Exchange Overvaluation: reaches a peak in t-2 (appreciation) and a trough at t. 
•  International Reserve Growth: on average they increase at 30% at t-3, and reach a 
minimum at t with a fall of -11% 
•  International Rate of Interest and Terms of Trade (TOT): they both reach a peak one 
period before the crises begin. For emerging economies, the increase in the international 
interest rate is very important for two reasons. Firstly, it is key to explain the capital inflow 
and outflow to emerging countries as pointed out by Calvo, Reinhart and Leiderman 
(1992). Secondly, it impacts on the service of external debt. An increase in the rate of 
interest is associated with worsening in quasi fiscal deficit and consequently in fiscal 
accounts. The fall in terms of trade during crises from a peak one period before crisis, 
which as we have already said, it let us think that in most severe crisis adverse external 
conditions were present . A similar behavior shows an international interest rate. This  
•  MTI and its components, as we expect, since we use them to sort crisis, behave differently 
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Note: color lines above and below the average are the intervals (u+ STD) and (u – STD) respectively. 
   
R R E E G G R R E E S S S S I I O O N N    A A N N A A L L Y Y S S I I S S       
Following Frankel and Rose (1996), in this section we try to characterized the currency crises 
suffered by Argentina through 118 years of history. Rather than testing a specific theory of 
crises  
We estimate a logit model whose binary dependent variable takes the value 0 for no-crises 
years, and 1 for crises years. Independent variables were classified into three groups: (i) 
Domestic Macroeconomic Indicators: real public expenditure growth, GDP growth, Real 
M3 growth. (ii) External Indicators: CAD, Reserves/Imports Ratio, Real Exchange Rate 
Over Valuation
vii, External Debt. (iii) Foreign Variables: International Rate of Interest, 
TOTThree alternative models were estimated using maximum likelihood
viii. Results are 
tabulated in Table 6. Since logit coefficients are not directly interpretable, we report the effect 
of a change in variables on the probability of crisis. We tabulated z-statistics with null 
hypothesis of no effect. We also report McFadden R squared. 
Most of the variables included are statistically significative at usual levels. It is found that the 
probability of crisis increases when GDP, real M3 growth, and the ratio reserves to imports 
fall. It crises are also more likely when the local currency appreciates (lagged once), and TOT 
impairs (although this variable is not statistically significative at standard values). 
On the other hand, an increase in public expenditure growth, in the current account deficit 
(lagged one period), in the external debt (not significative in Model 1), and an increase in the 
international rate of interest also increase the probability of crisis. 
Interestingly enough, the results of the regression let us conclude that fiscal variables have 
an important role in determining the probability of crisis. The domestic macroeconomic 
effects, measured by GDP growth and real M3 growth are very strong. An appreciation of the 
currency (lagged once) also increases the probability of a crisis, but contemporaneously it 
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However we can also see that an impairing of external conditions (measured by an increase 
in international rate of interest or by a worsening in TOT) makes a crisis more probable. 
Table 6. Regression Results.  

















































































LR statistic (11 df)  52.67285  60.28001  60.26328 
Probability (LR stat)  8.56E-08  3.21E-09  1.19E-09 
    McFadden R-squared  0.42324  0.484366  0.484 
Obs with Dep=0  92  92  92 
Obs with Dep=1  26  26  26 
Note: Z statistic in parenthesis below coefficient  
R R E E G G R R E E S S S S I I O O N N    T T R R E E E E    A A N N A A L L Y Y S S I I S S   
Regression Tree Analysis is a non-parametric device, aimed at identifying the characteristics 
of each crisis separately. This well-known method in many disciplines (see details in 
Appendix), was introduced in the analysis of currency crises by Kaminsky (2003).  
The regression tree method applied to currency crises has a couple of advantages when 
compared to other traditional methods. First, it does not impose the same functional form to 
all crises such as logit and probit models. Second, the probability of crises augments as the 
number of variables indicating vulnerability increases. For example, an expanding domestic 
credit may be explosive with convertibility and with capital inflow reversal. As far as we know, 19 
 
the Regression Tree approach has been applied only in cross-country analysis but we think it 
can also shed light on case studies like the present one.  
The output of regression tree method is a set of terminal nodes, each one characterizing a 
crisis or a group of crises. The method considers an initial split of the data into two subgroups 
according to the rule of minimum node. Many different criteria can be defined for selecting the 
best split at each node. However, the properties of the final tree selected are insensitive to 
the choice of splitting rule. Variable misclassification costs and prior distributions can be 
incorporated into the splitting structure in a natural way.  
This split is repeated in sequential form until each subset terminates either when there is no 
impurity reduction from splitting or when the number of observations in the cell is less than a 
specified number of rows.  
Results 
Previous to running the Regression Tree method, we classified years of crises and non-crises 
during 118 years of argentine history according to the MTI. We did not distinguish among 
crises intensity, i.e. deep, mild and minor turbulences. Indicators of crises were grouped 
according to the prescription of the first, second, third generation models and sudden stops. 
A total of fifteen indicators were used.  
Table 7. Indicators of Currency Crises Models   
Model of Currency Crises  Variables 
Fiscal Deficit (% GDP) 
Public Expenditure Growth 
First Generation Models 
Excess Real M1 Balances/GDP 
Exports Growth 
GDP Growth 
Real Exchange Rate Overvaluation 
Second Generation Models 
Current Account Deficit 
M2/Reserves Growth 
M2 Multiplier Growth 
M2/Reserves 
M2 Multiplier  
Third Generation Models 
Bank Deposits Growth 
Debt External  Debt/Exports 
Nominal Libor   Sudden Stop 
Nominal Libor Growth 
The results of regression tree are reported in Figure 1. They show the criteria for splitting the 
sample. The 34 years of crises were classified in different varieties of currency crises 20 
 
according to only five indicators (among the fifteen listed in table 4): Fiscal Deficit, Real 
Deposits, Overvaluation, Exports and Current Account Deficit. The overall importance of 
variables is presented in Table 1A. 
It is found that observations are assigned to six terminal nodes, which let us classify the 
crises into three different groups. The first split of the data is carried out on the fiscal deficit as 
percentage of GDP, with a threshold of 6.6. For values greater than that, we identify eight 
crisis years. This variety of crises is consistent with first generation models. 
For values minor than 6.6, there is a new split in the subgroup, performed by real total 
deposits. If its rate of growth is greater than -12.7, the new split comes from exports, and we 
have another final node with four crises. 
If real deposits grow less than -12.7%, the sample is split again by the variable overvaluation. 
If there is a RER overvaluation greater than -2.6, and changes in Current Account Deficit are 
less than 0.4, we find another terminal node with eight crises. 
Table 2A describes the characteristics of the final group. There we can identify indicators of 
vulnerability. In the first node (number 3) the only indicator of vulnerability is fiscal deficit, 
there are eight years of crises where fiscal deficit as percentage of GDP is greater than 6.6%. 
These crises correspond to the following years (see Table 3A): 1958, 1962, 1975 and 76 and 
1981 to 1985.  
Node 8 is related to an important fall in real deposits jointly with an impairing in current 
account deficit not greater than 0.43 and an overvaluation greater than -2,6. In that final node 
we find the following crises years: 1890, 1891, 1914, 1951, 1989, 1990, 1995 and 2001. 
Notice that node 8 includes the most severe crises Argentina went throughout its history. 
Node 10 is related with a considerable fall in exports. We identify this node with the following 
crises: 1921, 1930, 1938 and 1949. These crises are also consistent with a fall in Terms of 
Trade, which worsen the prices of exports, a fall of the international demand for Argentineans 
products or with a fall in production of primary goods, associated with climatological 
phenomenon.  
The results obtained so far are quite preliminaries. Future research is necessary, basically in 
improving the data set in two directions. The first one is related to increase the number of 
indicators variables to be used, for example we need better indicators of external debt, 
domestic credit, among others. The second one is related to broaden the period or periodicity 
of the data. One possibility is to look for date during XIX century; other possibility is to find 
quarterly data for the whole period. The increase in the sample would be necessary to assure 
consistency.  21 
 
However, even preliminary, some conclusions may be drawn. The first one is that extremely 
high fiscal deficit is responsible for eight currency crisis in Argentina. The second one is that 
worsen in external conditions may have deleterious consequences in Argentina, mainly when 
domestic imbalances are present. The third one, when many indicators of vulnerability are 
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Alguna vez nos deja pensativos la sensación “de haber vivido ya 
ese momento”.  
Jorge Luis Borges,  
La doctrina de los ciclos. En Historia de la Eternidad.  
 
For historians each event is unique. Economics, however, maintains 
that forces in society and nature behave in repetitive ways. History is 
particular, economics is general. 
Charles P. Kindleberger 
Manias, Panics, and Crashes: A History of Financial Crises, 
 
 
Throughout its history, Argentina suffered several crisis episodes, which has become more 
frequent and severe since 1930. In the second half of the 20
th century we dated 13 crises, 
and termed 3 of them as crashes. To give an idea of the magnitudes involved, the last crash, 
in 2001/ 2002, brought about a 15% decrease in real GDP and pushed vast sectors of the 
population below the poverty line. Similarly, the 1989 crash, which ended in hyperinflation, 
resulted in a 9% fall in real GDP. Why crises are so frequent and of such large magnitude? 
What are these crises caused by? Are there repeated factors or, different sets of variables 
intervene in each crisis, make them unique?  
This paper, is aiming at analyzing the “clinical record” of the “patient” named Argentina. We 
look for regularities and common factors repeated in theses extreme economical episodes 
throughout most of the lifetime of the country
ix. Our strategy involves various steps. 
First, using a Market Turbulence Index, defined as the weighed rate of change of exchange 
rate, reserves and interest rates, we date and classify crises in three categories: (a) “minor 
turbulent episodes”, (b) crisis (or “mild episodes”) and (c) crashes (or “deep” crisis). The MTI 
was built from monthly data for the period 1885-2002. 
Once we identified the critical episodes, we select 15 macroeconomic variables mentioned 
by the theories at stake as having a key role in explaining crises, and tests whether they 
behave significantly different in crises and non- crises years. It is found, by means of 
Wilcoxon, Median Chi-square, Kruskal-Wallis and van der Waerden tests, that the sample 
medians of the selected macroeconomic variables differ significantly during crises and non-
crises periods. Likewise, the two-sample Kolmogorv-Smirnov test also shows that the 
distributions of the selected variables are different in crises and non-crises periods. 
After that, we focus on crises episodes and their neighborhood. We perform graphical 
analysis of the selected macroeconomic variables, featuring three periods before and after 
crises. We observe that, except for the reversion in the current account, that supports the  
24 
 
sudden stop theory; all the variables behave as predicted by the first generation model of 
currency crises.  
We also estimate a logit model, including as regressors, again, the same macroeconomic 
variables. We found that fiscal variables have an important role in determining the probability 
of crisis. Likewise, domestic macroeconomic effects, measured by GDP growth and real M3 
growth, real exchange rate overvaluation (lagged once) and an impairing in external 
conditions (LIBOR) also make a crisis more probable. 
Finally, the regression tree approach detects six terminal nodes that let us classify the crises 
into three different groups but all of them having fiscal deficits as key components of the 
“cocktail” that characterize crises factors. Actually, the first node has high fiscal deficit as 
percentage of GDP as the only factor for 8 of the 20 crises identified. The other two nodes 
feature, on one hand, moderate fiscal deficit, falling bank deposits and diminishing exports 
growth. On the other hand, the third category is characterized by moderate fiscal deficit, 
falling bank deposits, real exchange rate overvaluation and current account deficit.   
With all this evidence at hand, some preliminary conclusions can be drawn: 
•  In most of the crises, regularities in the behavior of macroeconomic variables can be 
detected. In that sense, Prebisch was right.  
•  We can rule out Fiscal imbalances were always present, which is consistent with the 
predictions of first generation speculative attack models. In that sense, Alberdi were right. 
•  Adverse foreign factors had also a key role in explaining crises: an increase in 
international rate of interest and an impairing in TOT increases the probability of crisis. 
Notice, nonetheless, that adverse external conditions cannot explain any crisis by itself. 
The fiscal side has to be added to get a sound explanation of a given crisis.  
•  In like manner, we cannot affirm that argentine crises stem from the banking sector. Fall 
in deposits and other manifestations of banking problems are part of the dynamics of a 
given crisis but never its origin. As pointed out by della Paolera y Taylor (2003), in their 
analysis of early XX century crises, once the crisis starts, government takes banking 
funds, affecting financial sector solvency, which in turn feed the crisis and increases the 
probability of make it more severe.  
The severity and persistence of currency crises in Argentina, the high vulnerability to external 
shocks regardless of the type of government (de facto or constitutional) and the political party 
in office, seem to reveal problems at the roots of the country rather than associated to 
particular economic policies or specific adverse shocks. It all seems to point out at the 
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Table 1 A.. Crises Characteristics: 1914 – 2003. Monthly Data 
Exchange Rate  International Reserves  Interest Rate  Crisis breath 
Market Turbulence 
Index  
Trough Peak  Peak  Trough  Trough  Peak  Crisis 
$/U$S month  $/U$S  month 
Chang
e % 
mm   month  mm   month 
Chang




ng  End  # 
months I > 3 I > 2 I > 







1914  2351  Mar-14  2368 May-14  -0.72 232.1  Apr  14 196.39  Jul-14  -15.39  7.50 Apr  14  8.75  Aug  14  16.7 May-14  Jul-14 3  0 2 0 0 1 Mild 
1920/21  2330  Apr  20  3454 Jul-21  -32.54  470.6  Jul-20 470.6  May-21  0.00 7.38 Oct-20  8.13  Apr  21  10.2 Jul-20  May-21  11  0 0 1 1 5 Turbulence 
1929/31  2375  Jan 29  4260  Oct-31  -44.25  502.6  Jan 29  256.9  Feb-32  -48.88  6.13  Dec  28 7.87  May-31 28.4  Mar-29  Dec 31  22  3 6 1 6 4 Deep 
1937/38  3291  Jun-37  3903  Apr 38  -15.68  476.4  Jun-37  343.1  apr 38  -27.99  5.14  Oct-37  5.75  Jan 39  11.9  Mar-37  Apr 38  14  0  0  0  4  5  Turbulence 
1948/49  475  Apr 48  1650  Nov-49  -71.21  3737  Feb-48  2067  Jul-49  -44.69                 Mar-48  Nov-49  16  1  1  2  2  2  Mild 
1951  1374  Jun-50  2950  Sep-51  -53.42  2689  Dic-50  1866  Dic-51  -30.61                 Jan 51  Aug 51  8  0  1  0  2  1  Turbulence 
1958  3720  Dec 57  7350  Oct-58  -49.39  461120  May-57  101270 Oct-58  -78.04                 Jan 58  Oct-58  10  1  1  1  1  2  Mild 
1962  8420  dec 61  14840  Nov-62  -43.26  497765  Ago-61  120865 Oct-62  -75.72                 jan 62  Oct-62  10  1  1  0  0  5  Mild 
1964 /65  14040 May-64 28570  Jul-65  -50.86  321365  May-64  117180 Jun-65  -63.54                 Jun-64  Jun-65  13  0  1  2  0  5  Turbulence 
1971  41750 Feb-71  97750  Nov-71  -57.29  743825  Oct-71  194289 Jun-72  -73.88                 Jun-71  Jul-72  14  0  2  2  2  3  Mild 
1975 /76  14  Jun-74  333.5  Mar-76  -95.80  1536531  May-74  293346 Aug 75  -80.91                 Jul-74  Mar-76  21  2  4  2  5  2  Deep 
1981/82  1986.
5  Dec 80  61568.2 Nov-82  -96.77  7343.891 Jul-80  2425.13
6  Nov-82  -66.98  4.31 Oct-80  10.82  Jul.  81  151.04  Dec  80  Nov-82  24  1 2 1 6 1 Mild 
1983/84/ 
85  94650 May-83  952045
4.6  Aug  85  -99.01  3244.84  Jan  82  973.53  Feb-85  -70.00  10.00  May-83  31.40  May-85  214.00  Jul-83  Apr  85 22  0 0 5 3 6 Turbulence 
1987  8951.




0  Sep-88  987900
00  May-91  -99.86 2652.47 Nov-88  898.91  Jan  90  -66.11 8.35  Sep-88  83.20  Jun-89  896.41  Jan  89  Feb-91  26  11 1  0 2 1 Deep 
1995  1  Dec 94  1  Mar-95  0.00  9967.07  Nov-94  5958.6  Apr 95  -40.22  0.60  Oct-94  1.50  Apr 95  150.00  Dec 94  Mar-95  4  0  2  2  0  0  Mild 
2001/02  1  May-01 3.69  Nov-02  -72.87  27547  Sep-00  9031  Oct-02  -67.22  0.58  Aug 00  4.86  Jul-02  737.93  Oct-00  Oct-02  25  9  1  1  2  4  Deep 
 
Note: the rate of growth of exchange rates and international reserves were computed from a peak to trough, considering the behavior of these variables six months before and after the signal given by 




A Ap pp pe en nd di ix x   I I   
Table 2A. Panel A. Mean and Standard Deviation of Crises and non Crises 
Episodes.   
Growth Rate (%) 
  Parameter 
GDP  Public 
Expenditure* 
Public 
Revenue*  Inflation  M3/P 
Mean  -0.5  -1.5  -2.9  237.7  -3.7 
Crises 
Standard Deviation  6,3  15.4  14.2  617.4  29.2 
Mean 5.0  8.1  8.5  15.0  12.4 
Non-crises 
Standard Deviation  7,6  20.6  15.8  36.4  27.9 
Mean  3,6  6.1  5.1  81.7  7.6 
Total 
Standard Deviation  7,8  21.6  16,1  352.3  29.1 
 






Account/GDP  Terms of Trade 
Mean  -0.37  -3.68  -3.6  97.4 
Crises 
Standard Deviation  20,31  29,87  6.9  17.8 
Mean 10,84  13,14  -2.3 102.0  Non-crises 
  Standard Deviation  19,67  27,82  5.4  17.6 
Mean  7.0  7.58  -2.7  100,5 
Total 
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M Ma ac cr ro oe ec co on no om mi ic c   B Be eh ha av vi io or r   i in n   t th he e   N Ne ei ig gh hb bo or rh ho oo od d   o of f   
C Cr ra as sh he es s   
How did the Argentine economy perform in the neighborhood of crashes? Is there any 
regularity in the behavior of the macroeconomic variables around these extreme episodes? In 
order to approach to the answer of these questions we present a description of the macro 
variables behavior in the neighborhood of five “crashes” identified in section IV. Tables 5, 7, 9, 
11 and 13 summarize the behavior of the main fiscal, monetary and external sector indicators 
before, during and after each crash, while tables 4, 6, 8, 10 and 12 show how GDP evolved 
during crisis years and the behavior of the components of the Market Turbulence Index: 
exchange rate, international reserves and interest rate.  
•  Before crises.  
All five crashes had significant and persistent budget deficits in the years preceding 
each episode. Remarkably, the years before de 1975-76 crash show fiscal deficits 
around 8% of the GDP. Likewise, in the two years preceding the 1989-91 crisis and 
the 1890 –91 crisis budget deficit averaged 5.5% and 3.8% of the GDP respectively. 
A closer look at the fiscal history of Argentina shows that deficits were the norm and 
surpluses very rare: only the years 1893, 1920 and 1993 (see Figure 1).  
In all five crashes, public expenditures as well as the real money aggregate M3 grew 
at very high rates in the years preceding the crisis.  
We also verify increases in the interest rates, worsening in trade and current 
account deficits and severe drainage of international reserves.  
•  During Crises.  
In the five cases economic activity plunges and consequently imports diminish 
substantially, which in turn contributes to trade and current account adjustment.  
•  After Crises.  
After crisis, governments tighten fiscal accounts with a combination of fiscal revenue 
increment and public expenditure adjustment. 
 In the years following the 1889-91 and the 1989-91 crisis we also register a strong 







































































































































Source: Gerchunoff and Llach (2003) and own calculations. 
In order to give an historical content and context to the crises analysis, we offer a brief 
description of the events in each period. 
 
T T H H E E    B B A A R R I I N N G G    C C R R A A S S H H       
The root of the crisis can be found in the poor administration of President Juárez Celman, 
voted in 1886, characterized by the outrageous increased in public expenditure and the high 
level of indebtedness, both external and domestic. As reported in della Paolera (1994), in the 
period 1884-1890, Argentina absorbed 11% of the new portfolio issue of the London market, 
while the U.S. the 30%with a population 20 times larger.  
High public and private investments (in railroad, constructions, infrastructure) were financed 
with external borrowing. In this period government created the National Guarantee Banks 
(Bancos Nacionales Garantidos) that is, banks entitled to print their own money, which lead to 
huge increments in the monetary base.  
High levels of public indebtedness coupled with easy monetary policy brought about 
devaluation expectations, with the consequently fall in specie reserves. In 1890 most private 
and public banks broke and, given the impossibility of facing their obligations, a generalized 
default was declared. 
In April 1890 a new political party, Unión Cívica, generated a bloody insurrection that ended 
up in Juarez Celman resignation
x. According to Cortés Conde (1989), the revolution of the  
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90’s was not only a political but also a moral reaction to a wasteful administration, accused by 
the revolutionaries as a corrupt one. 
Table 4A. The Baring Crash 







Interest Rate Differential  GDP 
1889/90/91  -94.6 
1888 vs. 1891 
153.1 
1888 vs. 1891 
79.1 
1890 vs 1888 
-14.8 
1889 vs. 1891 
Note: See Table 1A  for details. 
In 1891 the minister of finance, carried out a tight fiscal and monetary policy that allowed 
restructuring public debt and the return to convertibility in November 1899. These measures, 
in addition to the reforms in the banking sector, were the cornerstone of a renewed stability 
and growth for more than 20 years.  
Table 5A. Macroeconomic performance in the neighborhood of the 1889–1891 crash. 
Growth rates 

























1887  11.9 27.18  24.48  10.0 20.9 22.9  1.65  95.5 -18.5 
1888 9.9  -8.68  7.03  34  18.6  9.4  2.29  92.9  -20.4 
1889  17.2 9.38  8.09  33  -9.9  28.1 1.69  78.4 -30.4 
1890  -4.3  -23.65  -31.6  12  11.9  -13.6  0.63  73.4  -24.5 
1891  -11.1  -34.12  -11.75  -23  2.4  -52.7  0.79  67.2  1.1 
1892  8.8 69.79  14.92  -7  9.9 36.1 0.35  80.5 -0.3 
1893  4.9 17.77  -1.65  7 -17.0  5.1 -0.02 73.5 -7.5 
* Millions of Gold Pesos 
Source: Llach and Gerchunoff (2003), Cortés Conde (1989), della Paolera (1988) and Taylor (1997) 
T T H H E E    G G R R E E A A T T    D D E E P P R R E E S S S S I I O O N N       
The World War I forced President Victorino de la Plaza
xi to suspend the full convertibility of the 
peso in August 1914, after 13 years of gold standard regime. 
Argentina returned to convertibility in 1927, but abandoned it in December 1929 under the 
pressures of what later would develop into a worldwide depression. Gold backing of the 
currency diminished from 80% in 1928 to 45% in 1931 and the paper peso suffered 65% 
depreciation relative to the U.S. dollar. As reported in della Paolera (1994), Argentina was the 
only major Latin America debtor to honor the service on its external debt but at the cost of 




Table 6A. The great depression 







Interest Rate  Real GDP 
Duration (months) 




Jan 1929 - Feb 1932 
79.5 
Jan 1929 - Oct 1931 
28.4 




Mar 1929 - Feb 1932 
Note:    See Table 1A for details. The rate of growth of International reserves as well as exchange rate 
depreciation are computed from a peak to a trough in the neighborhood of the crisis 
* Rate of growth of the depreciation of the local currency with respect to the U.S. dollar 
The 1929-32 crisis was a turning point not only for economic reasons (egulation and 
interventionism started in those years) but also because the first coup d’etat ocurred in 
Sepember 6, 1930 opening a dark period of interruptions of the constitutional order. 



























1927 9.4  7.3  41.1  6.8  33.1 11.1  1.8  88.8  -0.6 
1928  -0.2  7.7  -13.4  11.4 4.6 14.2 0.3  87.1  -1.2 
1929  1.9  2.4  8.7  -2.2  -10.9  1.6  2.7  120.3  -3.9 
1930  -8.5  -13.1  9.1  -1.0  -43.8  -25.1  3.7  109.3  -9.5 
1931  -1.8  18.5  -2.6  3.5  -17.3  -44.6  0.8  106.0  -3.2 
1932  -4.8  17.6  3.7  10.7  -21.3  -36.7  4.9  79.2  -0.7 
1933  1.8  -11.6  -9.4  -13.1 3.8 29.0 1.3  82.3  -0.3 
1934 10.0  12.8  17.7  14  32.8  14.5  1.4  77.8  0.1 
Source: IERAL (1986) , Taylor (1997) 
T T H H E E    1 19 97 76 6   C C R R A A S S H H       
In October 1973, Perón started his third period as President of Argentina, but a few months 
later, in July 1974 died and was succeeded by the vice-president, his widowed, María Estela 
Martínez. The fiscal situation was uncontrolled, the fiscal deficit as percentage of GDP was 
8% and real public expenditure grew at 27%. In 1975 the fiscal deficit peaked 16% of the 
GDP. From June 1974 to March 1976, the depreciation of the peso Ley was 2282%. Again, 
we can associate crisis to increasing public expenditures and huge fiscal deficit 
In March 1976, the militaries (Junta Militar) took the power. The junta tried to make economic 
reforms mainly directed at stopping inflation. The minister of economy, José Martínez de Hoz, 
attempted many devices to stabilize and recover economic growth. In December 1978, after 
another failure to control the inflation rate, a new plan was launched having as an anchor for 
the inflation a pre announced exchange rate known as “la tablita”. By the end of 1980, the  
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evident inconsistency between the monetary and fiscal policy caused a run against the peso 
and forced the government to devaluate in February 1981. 
Again, crisis and increasing public expenditures and huge fiscal deficit are positively related 
Table 8A. The 1976 crash 





Depreciation  Real GDP 
Duration (months) 
Beginning - End 
1975/76  -80.9 
May 1974 – Aug 1976 
2282.3 




Jul 1974 – Mar 1976 
Note:  See Table 1A for details. 
*GDP growth values are those of the following years, since we try to capture the impact of the crises 
 




























1973 3.7  13.25  16.88  20 68.26  17.03 7.6 105.2  0.8 
1974 5.4  31.08  26.85  26 20.35  63.04 8.1 115.4  0.1 
1975  -6.0  -29.05  -0.90  -20  -24.66  8.57  16.1  99.9  -2.6 
1976  0.0  16.13  -18.68  -15  32.24  -23.15  13.6  99.5  0.9 
1977 6.4  17.73  3.83  20 44.32  37.21 8.3  95.1  1.7 
1978  -3.2 -4.40  13.85  4  13.23  -7.88  10.3  86.7 2.1 
Source: IERAL (1986) , Taylor (1997) 
H H Y Y P P E E R R I I N N F F L L A A T T I I O O N N     A A N N D D     C C R R I I S S I I S S       
After the defeat in the Malvinas war, the military regime came to an end and in 1983 the Junta 
transferred the power to the elected president Raúl Alfonsín.  
After failing attempts in his beginnings, Alfonsín launched the anti-inflationary plan known as 
Austral that consisted on a few fiscal measures on the revenues side and a currency 
substitution (the Argentinean’s peso was replaced by a new currency denominated austral, 
which represented 10000 argentine pesos). He also froze prices, wages, fares and fuels. The 
exchange rate would be fixed and controlled. In 1986 inflation rate was under control, reaching 
one-digit monthly rates, which represented a real achievement to the government. But it lasted 
very few. In 1987 inflation accelerated again and many social conflicts took place. In April 
1988 Argentina unilaterally suspended the service of the debt, entering de facto in default. 
Real GDP shrank and inflation went completely out of control starting in March 1989 with an  
35 
 
annual rate of 4924%. The hyperinflation caused chaos and signaled the final collapse of the 
closed-economy approach. Alfonsín resigned six months early in July 1989. 
Table 10A. The 1989 crash 





Depreciation  Interest Rate  GDP 
Duration 
(months) 





Nov 1988 - Jan 1990 
42179.5 
Sep 1988 - May 1990 
896.4 
Sep 1988 - Jun 1989 
-6.15 
90 vs 89 
26 
Jan 1989  - Feb 1991 
Very 
Deep 
Note: See Table 1A  for details. 
An important feature that characterized this period was the impossibility or the unwillingness 
for controlling public expenditures. Towards 1987, subsidies to private production amounted 
6.6% of GDP. Adding the deficit of public enterprises gave an astonished 10% of GDP spent 
on enterprises. On the other hand, different social benefits increased too. The expansion in 
public expenditure in the period 1970-1985 was of such magnitude that in 1970 it was 19.7% 
of GDP while in 1985 represented 25.3% of GDP. Of course, the main problem was how to 
finance an ever-increasing public expenditure. External resources were exhausted, mainly 
after the debt crisis, internal taxes were not enough to cover government expenditures, so 
inflation tax was the only resource available. 



























1987 2.58  0.06  10.6  -1.0  -7.24 22.78 4.99  79.1  -3.9 
1988 -1.88  -5.32  -11.46  20.3 43.72 -8.44  6.05  89.3  -1.2 
1989  -6.22  0.32  -10.28  -5.9  4.87  -20.99  3.79  89.7  -1.7 
1990  -1.3  -18.4  -4.8  -65.4  28.95  -3.61  2.79  84.1  1.3 
1991  10.5  16.6  11.33  -16.5  -2.65  101.67  0.90  88.7  -1.5 
1992 10.3  14.2  12.51  27.8  2.31 79.26 0.06  95.4  -3.7 
1993 6.03  7.85  7.10  22.4  6.26 15.64 -0.32  96.3  -3.5 
Source: Ministerio de Economía de la Nación 
T T H H E E    E E N N D D     O O F F    C C O O N N V V E E R R T T I I B B I I L L I I T T Y Y   
In April 1991, Menem launched the so-called Convertibility Plan, a currency board system that 
tied the peso to the U.S. dollar at 1 to 1 rate. The fixed exchange rate served as an anchor to 
prices ending with decades of high inflation rates. In the first three years, convertibility was 
supported by important reforms, such as deregulation and privatization of state-owned 
companies, which brought about an economic boom. Argentina attracted extensive foreign  
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investment, allowing banks, public utilities and other key sectors to modernize by incorporating 
new technology. Two major problems were present in Menem administration: high 
unemployment rates and high corruption indexes. 
Table 12A. The 2001/2002 crash 












Beginning - End 
Type 
2001/02  -67.2 
Sep 2000 – Oct 2002 
268.8 
May 2001 – Nov 2002 
737.9 
Aug 2000- Jul 202  -14.8  25 
Oct 2000 – Oct 2002 
Very 
Deep 
Note: See Table 1A  for details. 
In December 1999, De la Rúa became president. Given the unwillingness of financial markets 
to finance a higher debt, De la Rúa administration was mainly concerned with reducing fiscal 
deficit. But as cutting spending was politically difficult, he raised taxes, so as not to abandon 
convertibility. The recession that had begun by the end of 1998 aggravated during 2000. The 
minister of the Economy, Machinea, resigned and was succeeded by Lopez Murphy, who 
attempted to cut spending, but given the strong interest groups opposition, he resigned and 
Cavallo was appointed Minister of the Economy. In December 2001 government imposed a 
freeze on bank deposits, in response to large withdrawals, known as “corralito”. A general 
strike and protest resulted in the resignation of De la Rúa. 




























1997  8.1  12.68  6.11  21.5 13.46  26.27 1.46 106.5  -4.2 
1998 3.9  2.99  4.82  22.1 -1.65 3.90 1.36  100.7 -4.9 
1999 -3.4  -2.69  5.23  7.0 -11.42  -19.16  1.68 94.7  -4.2 
2000 -0.8  3.21  0.46  -1.2 11.22 0.30  2.39 104.2  -3.1 
2001  -4.4  -6.02  -0.17  -6.0  2.96  -19.92  3.24  103.7  -1.7 
2002  -11.0  -15.9  -23.56  -52.1  --3.1  -55.41  1.3  101.9  9.2 
2003 8.7  26.7  13.1  26.6 14.2 53.7  2.3 110.1  6.0 
Source: Ministerio de Economía de la Nación 
Three presidents followed in less than two weeks. One of them, Rodriguez Saá, decided to 
default on the government debt to foreign private sector lenders. Finally the Congress chose 
Duhalde (2002) to serve the rest of former president term. His first measure was to end with 
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i Excessiveness is also an outstanding feature of Argentina’s economic life. Periods of euphoria and 
unlimited enthusiasm are followed by frustration and endless delusion without any transition time (see 
Prebisch’s quotation) 
ii In a Radio Speech reproduced by the Central Bank in its Memoria Anual, President Frondizi asserted: 
“En los últimos 15 años, la Argentina ha gastado mucho más de lo que producía, omitiendo reponer las 
inversiones básicas de capital y endeudándose fuertemente en el exterior. ... Más del 80% de los 
ingresos del Estado se va en sueldos, y ello explica que no haya dinero para hacer viviendas, ni 
caminos, ni escuelas, ni siquiera para reparar pavimentos o dar más luz a nuestras obscuras calles... 
La Argentina ha estado viviendo una ficción económica, cuyas consecuencias están claramente a la 
vista...Todos los gobiernos han coincidido en la necesidad de reducir los elencos administrativos y las 
crecientes pérdidas de los servicios públicos, pero año tras año, esos gastos y esas pérdidas han ido 
en aumento ...” 
iii Flood and Garber (1984) derive explicitly a solution for the time of collapse in a fixed exchange rate 
regime. 
iv Some researchers have proposed indexes that weight different components of speculative attacks. 
However in some cases they are not easy to construct, as is the case in Girton and Roper (1979) 
v We also included the rate of interest in the index but for some sub periods this series is not available 
on monthly basis.  
vi For the period 1885-1914 monthly data to compute the index were not available, so we used annual 
data. 
vii The degree of overvaluation of domestic currency is measured as the deviation from the trend 
viii We also estimated by probit and Linear Probability Model, but results do not differ significantly 
ix Argentina declared its independence from Spain in 1816 and our study covers the period 1885 to the 
present. 
x The vice-president, Carlos Pellegrini, succeeded Juárez Celman 
xi President Roque Sáenz Peña died in 1914 and was succeeded by Vice- President Victorino de la 
Plaza. 